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1 Introduction
The Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism (Becker et al., 1964) is a well known
incentive-compatible mechanism, frequently used in experimental economics and in non-
market valuation. It is a very important tool for measuring subjects’ valuations both inside
and outside the lab and thus widely used in the marketing field for the valuation of novel
products and product attributes. In experimental economics, the BDM mechanism is usually
employed for the valuation of lotteries or tokens, to examine agents’ risk/time preferences
or departures from standard economic models of individual behavior. As a testament to
its popularity, Becker et al. (1964) count more than 2,100 citations in Google Scholar as of
March 2018. From a theoretical point of view, the mechanism is strategically equivalent to
a Vickrey auction against an unknown bidder (Vickrey, 1961) and thus it is often referred
to as an additional auction format.
The BDM mechanism is simple and presumed to induce truth-telling since based on
Expected Utility Theory (EUT), it is in the best interest of bidders to report their true
value for the object, irrespective of other factors such as their risk preferences. In addition,
if preferences do not violate the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms and in particular the
dominance axiom, BDM bids should equal one’s true value for the goods, independent of
the underlying price distribution from which the binding price is randomly drawn. This
is also true even with loss-averse agents in the case that decision weights are linearized to
be probabilities.1 However, Karni and Safra (1987) showed that the BDM is not incentive-
compatible in valuing lotteries, even for rational agents (i.e., those that do not violate the
weak-ordering axiom). They attributed the phenomenon of preference reversals that is of-
ten observed in implied choices between lotteries using the BDM, to the violation of the
independence axiom. Horowitz (2006) also pointed out that the BDM may not be incentive-
compatible even when the objects involve no uncertainty, as in the case of regular products.
Other studies (discussed in Section 2) have also questioned the usefulness of the mechanism
in the presence of behavioral biases, such as expectations-based loss aversion and anchoring.
Some researchers doubt that the BDM is appropriate to study these biases, as participants’
bids are not even error-prone signals of true preferences (Cason and Plott, 2014). Addi-
tional issues have also been raised related to the effect of wording used in the experimental
instructions and subjects’ anonymity (Plott and Zeiler, 2004, 2007).
We revisit these behavioral issues associated with the BDM mechanism discussed above.
Unlike previous attempts to manipulate expectations through exogenous lotteries (Marzilli Er-
1Note that by true value, we mean the highest deterministic price at which the subject would decide to
buy the object in a relevant market. Thus, we make the plausible assumption that a subject who is loss
averse in the experiment will also be loss averse in the respective market.
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icson and Fuster, 2011; Smith, 2012), we use procedures that mimic those of the typical
mechanism. Our procedures avoid signaling the “objective” value of the auctioned good or
causing misconceptions, especially given the added complexity that exogenous lotteries could
introduce to the mechanism.2 In addition, we control for price and loss anchoring effects
that may be present in previous studies (e.g., Banerji and Gupta, 2014; Bohm et al., 1997)
and are related to the highest price and the maximum possible loss.3
In the BDM format that we employ in this study, the virtual urn used for determining
the random binding price has numbered outcomes instead of prices outcomes, with each
number mapping onto a price from a predetermined range. This mapping is used as an
experimental design variable where for example, the numbers {1, 2, . . . , 120} correspond to
prices {e0.1, e0.2, . . . , e12.0} in one treatment and to the prices {e0.1, e0.2, . . . , e6.0}
in another. We posit that the use of numbers facilitates decoupling of expectations about
getting the auctioned good — which in our design are given by the relative frequencies of
the numbered outcomes — with price anchors that are affected by the highest and lowest
possible price outcomes. By doing so, we implicitly assume that anchoring of bids on the
numbered outcomes is not likely to happen. This is mainly for two reasons: 1) numbers
are not expressed on the money scale and are therefore irrelevant as bidding anchors 2) the
numbers are implausibly large in relation to a subject’s potential bid (in our experiment
numbers in the virtual urn run from 1 to 60 or from 1 to 120). Previous research supports
these assumptions, showing that anchors of an item’s value in years of life expectancy did
not affect judgments of its dollar value and vice-versa (Chapman and Johnson, 1994) or that
passive or active number searches or implausible anchors do not affect bids in incentivized
willingness-to-pay (WTP) elicitation experiments (Sugden et al., 2013).
Finally, another modification of the mechanism we use in our design is that we do not have
a one-to-one correspondence between actual payments (losses) and prices in all treatments,
unlike the usual BDM where the maximum amount a subject may pay is her bid. Thus, as
explained momentarily, we separate price anchors from loss anchors (which are driven by the
highest and lowest possible loss, respectively) that are expected to have opposite effects.
In the next section, we review the biases relevant to the BDM mechanism that we are
examining in the current study. We then present our experimental design in Section 3, then
2For example, the high or low probability of winning the prize to be auctioned later, may be perceived
as a signal of good value e.g., a higher probability might indicate a less valuable prize. In addition, in cases
where both the draw regarding whether subjects will be able to trade and the random price determination
are done simultaneously, the participants might face difficulties to assign the correct probability in each
state.
3As explained below, the highest price could anchor subjects’ bids causing price anchoring while the
maximum possible loss could make the utility dimensions related to money more salient and thus cause loss
anchoring.
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the results and conclude in the last section.
2 Behavioral biases and the BDM mechanism
In this section, we discuss the behavioral biases that have been related to the BDM
mechanism. We also cite the relevant literature that has tried to explore these biases and
discuss how our experiment differs from these past studies.
2.1 Expectations
The idea of expectations-based loss aversion was introduced in Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006)
who presented a model that is similar to prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;
Tversky and Kahneman, 1991) but where the reference points are formed by expectations
(instead of the status-quo). Smith (2008, 2012) was the first to test this model in the context
of the BDM mechanism. In his experiments, just before the valuation task, subjects took
part in a lottery with a university mug as the prize. The high (low) probability group was
informed that they would be given the opportunity to get the mug with a probability of
70% (10%). The subjects who were given the opportunity to purchase the mug were allowed
to participate in a BDM procedure by stating their maximum WTP for the mug. Results
showed that although assignment to the high probability of winning the prize produced a
small increase in valuation, this effect was not statistically significant.
Marzilli Ericson and Fuster (2011) elicited willingness-to-accept (WTA) values for a uni-
versity mug using a similar design to Smith (2008, 2012). In their high (low) probability
treatment, there was a 80% (10%) chance that subjects would get a mug for free (and then
participate in a BDM experiment to sell it) and a 10% (80%) chance that they would get
nothing (and thus not take part in the subsequent BDM procedure). Besides the elicitation
format (WTP vs. WTA), the main difference with the experiments of Smith (2008, 2012)
was that subjects submitted their bid before they knew the realized state of nature, namely
before they reached the point where they knew whether their bids would actually matter
(i.e whether they will have the chance to participate in the BDM). Marzilli Ericson and
Fuster (2011) found a 20%-30% higher valuation in the high probability treatment which
they attributed to the induced higher expectation of being able to leave the experiment with
the mug as compared to the low expectation treatment.
In addition to the studies cited above, Banerji and Gupta (2014) provided theoretical
and experimental results that confirm the role of expectations in the BDM mechanism.
They varied the support of the randomly drawn bid for a chocolate and found a significant
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difference in valuations, a result which is in accordance with expectation-based reference
points. Bohm et al. (1997) on the other hand, manipulated the uniform price support in a
BDM experiment and found a reverse effect of expectations on WTA bids for petrol coupons.
Other relevant studies include Mazar et al. (2013) who tested the sensitivity of valuations to
the underlying distribution in the BDM using travel mugs and Amazon vouchers; Urbancic
(2011) using a within-subjects design and a gift certificate product redeemable for cookies;
and Tymula et al. (2016) who used products with higher market values such as a backpack,
an iPod Shuﬄe, and a pair of noise-canceling headphones. Although all these studies did
not explicitly refer to expectation-based preferences (with the exception of Tymula et al.,
2016) but rather examined the distributional dependence of the valuations, a closer look at
their results suggest patterns that are opposite to the ones expected under the Ko˝szegi and
Rabin (2006) model of behavior.
2.2 Price anchoring
Besides expectations, anchoring is a well-known behavioral anomaly first detected by
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) in their famous wheel-of-fortune experiment. Tversky and
Kahneman (1974) used a wheel of fortune with numbers between 0 and 100 that was actually
rigged to stop only on 10 or 65. They found a significant effect of the drawn number
on subjects’ estimates of the number of African countries in the UN and concluded that
respondents do not have predefined values and are thus using any given anchor to make a
series of dynamic adjustments towards their final estimate. Because these adjustments are
insufficient, the subjects end up with estimates that are close to the anchor. In a typical
BDM experiment, although subjects are not explicitly asked to compare their WTP with any
other value, it is possible that they start the formulation of their bids by comparing their
value to relevant anchors. Another more convincing explanation in terms of non-market
valuation is that anchoring biases might be based on the concept of associative coherence
(Morewedge and Kahneman, 2010). According to this concept, anchors (even unrealistic
ones) bring to mind coherent attributes that would justify such an anchor. For example, a
high price anchor in an auction would urge subjects into thinking of the quality attributes
that would justify such a high price, while in the case of a low anchor, the opposite would be
expected (i.e., focusing on the less desirable attributes). Finally, anchors may also serve as
‘objective’ indicators of goods whose value is uncertain to decision makers. Drawing on the
example of Mazar and Ariely (2006), a consumer might attach higher utility to having an
original piece of art in his living room than having an exact copy, even if no resale options
are available or even if she cannot detect any difference between the two.
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In the BDM mechanism, subjects face a number of anchors and thus anchoring could be
a relevant concept in such experiments. For example, the lowest and highest competing price
for the auctioned good could anchor subjects’ valuations based on the ideas we discussed
in the previous paragraph. The same could be said for prices given in examples during the
training stage. Other anchors may be (beliefs of) market prices of similar goods, or feedback
from previous rounds (in the case of experiments with multiple rounds). In summary, the
discussion above suggests that anchoring may have an effect on subjects’ bids through either
or both of these: a) the comparative mechanism that involves a comparison of bids with an
anchor first and then forming an estimate and b) basic anchoring, in the sense of Wilson et al.
(1996) who showed that mere display of values may anchor judgments, even without any
comparison. Although basic anchoring has been found not to be robust in other settings (e.g.,
Brewer and Chapman, 2002), to our knowledge this has not been tested in the framework
of non-market valuation. An exception is Sugden et al. (2013) who rejected basic anchoring
with the use of numerical anchor; the difference between Sugden et al. (2013) and our study
being that Sugden et al. (2013) examined anchors other than the prices used in the BDM
procedure.
2.3 Loss anchoring
Besides price anchors, the amount of potential losses (what we call loss anchors in this
paper) could also affect subjects’ bidding behavior in an experiment. We parallel the concept
of loss anchoring with that of salience i.e., the phenomenon that when one’s attention is dif-
ferentially directed to one portion of the environment rather than to others, the information
contained in that portion will receive disproportional weighting in subsequent judgments
(Taylor and Thompson, 1982). Bordalo et al. (2012, 2013) introduced models of salience
in binary choices between prospects and goods while Ko˝szegi and Szeidl (2013) developed
models of salience for inter-temporal choices. These models revolve around the idea that
decision-makers maximize weighted (expected) utility functions, where states or attributes
(utility dimensions) with the largest difference in outcomes are more salient and get extra
weight.
The distinct difference between previous theories of salience and the loss anchoring hy-
pothesis we use in this study is that in theories of salience, weighting takes place at the
evaluation phase. In the context of the BDM, this would be translated to weights being
endogenous to the bid and vice versa, a fact that makes predictions less tractable. This
is because any factor (like price anchoring or expectations) that causes one’s bid to raise
would automatically result in higher money salience, which would in turn affect her bid. So,
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any observed effect would always be confounded by salience distortions. Our loss anchoring
hypothesis on the other hand, is built on the alternative hypothesis that utility differences
are realized before bids are formed (the editing phase according to Kahneman and Tver-
sky, 1979) and as such, attention drawn during this stage does not adjust (or at least only
partially adjusts) later when bids are formed. Based on the full knowledge on the utility
differences associated with the relevant utility dimensions, the greater the differences, the
heavier the utility dimensions are weighted.
So how can loss anchoring be related to bidding behavior in the BDM mechanism? In
non-market valuation settings, when entering a BDM experiment, subjects realize that they
will eventually face a choice task involving trade-offs between cash and the auctioned good.
They also realize the utility differences within each of the utility dimensions that may be
generated from the outcomes of the experiment.4 In particular, for a subject facing a BDM
task, it quickly becomes clear how much of the good they can get from the procedure (that
is, one item for single-unit valuation tasks) as well as the ex-ante (i.e., before they start
thinking about the problem and forming their bids) maximum amount of money they may
end up giving away at the end of the task. Although the loss anchoring mechanism seems to
be similar to that of price anchoring, in reality they are distinct from each other since loss
anchoring does not embody values that are out of the choice set of decision makers but only
feasible ones; i.e., those that will possibly enter the subjects’ utility functions during the
course of a choice situation. In addition, loss anchoring is expected to exhibit an opposite
pattern from that of price anchors since anchors generating the most vivid differences (either
at the high- or at the low-end) can lead to lower valuations due to heavier weighting of the
part of utility that is associated with money.
3 Experimental Design and Procedures
An invitation was sent by email to 585 subjects from the undergraduate population of
the Agricultural University of Athens in Greece asking them to participate in a computerized
experiment at the Laboratory of Behavioral and Experimental Economics Science (LaBEES-
Athens). 348 subjects out of 585 signed up for the experiment (about 59.5% acceptance rate)
and 307 (88.9% show-up rate) showed up and participated. Seven subjects were excluded
from the analysis since they were not undergraduate students (although they had registered
as such in the system) so that the final useful sample consisted of 300 subjects. Subjects were
recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) and participated in 24 sessions of 8 to 16 subjects
4For simplicity, we assume that the consumer’s utility is additively separable in money and the remaining
dimensions, so that they constitute different attributes in one’s utility function.
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each. All sessions started from 10:00 am and concluded by 3:30 pm, counterbalancing the
order of treatments. Although subjects participated in group sessions, there was no interac-
tion at any point between subjects and group sessions only served as a means to economize
on resources. All sessions lasted approximately an hour.
Upon arrival, subjects were given a consent form to sign and were randomly seated to
one of the PC private booths. Subjects were specifically instructed to raise their hand and
ask any questions in private and that the experimenter would then share his answer with the
group. Subjects received a show-up fee of e5 and a fee of e10 for completing the experiment
which lasted about an hour. During the experiment, subjects were given the chance to bid
to obtain a mug and the binding bid was subtracted from their fees so that average total
payouts (on top to the show-up fee) was e9.37 (S.D.=1.45, min=2.9, max=10).
In order to tease out the behavioral biases related to the BDM mechanism, our experi-
mental design consisted of five between-subjects treatments using variants of the mechanism.
The treatments were designed based on the idea that since a typical BDM involves randomly
drawing a price from a uniform distribution, the maximum and minimum of the support de-
termine expectations (i.e., the probability of getting the product, conditional on one’s bid).
At the same time both of these amounts, can also serve as price and loss anchors as described
in Section 2. Table 2 summarizes the experimental design that is explained in detail below.
The baseline treatment (T0) is used as a benchmark and is a typical one-shot WTP elicita-
tion for a mug with a university logo (depicted in Figure A1 in the Electronic Supplementary
Material). The mug is not available for sale in the market and was custom-made for the
purpose of the experiment. We should note that memorabilia with university logos are not
typically sold on university stores in Greek universities and certainly not in the university
where the experiment took place. Therefore, the mug with university insignia was really
unique. Our intention was to elicit valuations for unique products without no close field
substitutes so that subjects would not have formed expectations about the market price of
the products. Subjects would also not be able to guess the price of the mug since other
similar products were not available in the market.5
We used a single experimenter for all sessions (one of the authors). The experiment was
fully computerized using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). The experimenter read
aloud experimental instructions.6 Subjects also had a hard copy of the instructions available
in their private booth which they were free to check at any time during the session. They
then received extensive training by participating in 10 repetitions of a BDM mechanism
5Mugs without university logos are not uncommon in the local market, but their price range is very wide
thus market price inferencing was a very difficult task.
6Experimental instructions are reproduced in the Electronic Supplementary Material.
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with a non-focal good (a USB flash drive) in order to give them ample opportunity to fully
understand the procedure before the actual (single-shot) BDM that would follow where
any decision would be binding. Although according to Sugden et al. (2013), the randomly
determined prices of dissimilar products are not expected to act as anchors, we used various
low, medium and high prices in the examples given in the experimental instructions to avoid
such an effect (see Examples 1, 2 and 3 in the Experimental Instructions). In addition, these
possible anchors were kept constant across all treatments. A set of seven True/False quiz
questions regarding the BDM followed and correct answers were explained aloud. A major
difference of our task to other BDM procedures was that in addition to letting subjects freely
type their bid, we used an interface where subjects had to scroll a slide bar between 0 and
15 Euros (see figure 1 below).7
Figure 1: Bidding screen
Upon sliding the bar horizontally, at any point between or at the two sides, subjects were
given a number of relevant information: 1) the bid amount corresponding to the current
point where the bar was released 2) the probability of leaving the session with the mug (as
part of the instructions, the experimenter explained how the objective probabilities were
calculated in detail; see Experimental Instructions) and 3) the highest price they could pay
for the mug if they were to submit this bid. We presented this information to subjects
having in mind Ratan (2015) who showed that such information alone is unlikely to affect
subjects’ bids. Subjects also had the opportunity to move the bar by typing their bid, if they
7The monetary interval of the bar was kept constant across all treatments. To avoid uncontrolled
anchoring effects, the starting point of the bar was set to zero.
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wished to do so. Most importantly, as mentioned before, in order to facilitate decoupling
of expectations about the outcome with price anchors, the binding price was determined
by a random draw of a set of 60 numbers (1-60) and not prices; each of the sixty numbers
corresponded to a price in the following fashion: {1, 2, . . . , 59, 60} → {e0.1, e0.2, . . . , 5.9,
e6.0} (see Table A1 in the Electronic Supplementary Material). We included a similar table
in the experimental instructions mapping numbers to prices, which subjects could refer to
at any point during the experiment.
The first two treatments (T1 and T
EL
0 )were designed to test whether subjects’ behaviors
can be explained by standard preferences or whether subjects exhibit signs of loss aversion,
and if loss aversion is at play, whether the status-quo or expectations are more likely to act
as the respective reference points.
The T1 treatment was designed to manipulate expectations in a way that would not affect
price and loss anchors. The only difference between T1 and the baseline treatment T0 was that
60 more numbers were added to the virtual urn in T1 (thus, the random draw was between
numbers 1-120). The sixty extra number corresponded to a price of 6 euros (see Table A2 in
the Electronic Supplementary Material), so the new number to price correspondence followed
the following fashion: {1, 2, . . . , 59, 60, 61 . . . 119, 120} → {e0.1, e0.2, . . . , e5.9, e6.0,
e6.0 . . . , e6.0, e6.0 }. Thus, adding the numbers had no effect the range of possible prices
of the mug (the price of the mug was still expected to be somewhere between e0.1 and e6,
as in T0) but it did affect the probability of price realizations: with 50% probability the price
would be between e0.1 and e6 and with 50% probability it would be e6. Notice that the
loss anchor should not be affected by treatment T1 since the maximum loss that a subject
could incur during the experiment is still e6. Similarly, the price anchor is also not affected,
since the minimum and maximum price a subject could purchase the mug is e0.1 and e6,
respectively. However, as long as expectations are not expected to double one’s equilibrium
bid given her true value (but rather to slightly decrease it, see Banerji and Gupta, 2014),
treatment T1 decreases the probability of leaving the experiment with the mug for any value
with an interior solution in T0 (i.e., between e0 and e6). Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2014)
show how this weakened ‘attachment effect’ is expected to drive bids into lower levels under
the Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) framework. Thus, expectations-based preferences would be
supported by a negative treatment effect in T1 when compared to T0. On the other hand,
the absence of a treatment effect would lead to rejection of this preference structure but
would fail to distinguish between rational agents in the neoclassical sense and agents with
reference-dependent preferences whose reference points are formed by the status-quo and not
their expectations.
To avoid a failure of distinguishing between rational agents and agents with reference-
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dependent preferences, we designed the Equivalent Loss treatment (TEL0 ). The T
EL
0 treat-
ment was again identical to the baseline treatment T0, with the exception that instead of
subjects bidding to acquire a mug, they bid to avoid returning the piece of mug they have
been endowed with at the beginning of the session. If reference points are formed by current
status (i.e., having the mug) and subjects are loss averse, leaving the session without the
mug would be considered a loss. Thus, the WTP and EL measures are expected to differ
(see also Bateman et al., 1997). On the other hand, since expected utility for each bid is not
affected by framing under EUT, the WTP and EL measures of value should be equal under
this framework. This would be the case as well, if bidders are loss-averse but expectations
rather than the status-quo act as reference points. This is because the probability of leaving
the experiment with the mug given a subject’s bid is the same for both the TEL0 and the T0
treatments, so expectations are not affected.
In essence, the TEL0 treatment will reveal whether a null effect in T1 is due to expectations
acting as reference points or due to reference-dependent preferences in general. In particular,
if we do not detect any treatment effect in T1 and we also find a null effect in T
EL
0 , the
neoclassical preference structure cannot be rejected; on the contrary, if the treatment effect
in TEL0 is not null while the T1 treatment effect is null, then the concept of reference-
dependence would not be rejected, but expectations cannot be considered a valid reference
point. In case that a non-null effect is detected in T1, then T
EL
0 becomes a test of the no-
loss-in-buying (NLIB) hypothesis of Novemsky and Kahneman (2005). To understand why
this is the case, remember that expectations (and, thus, reference points) are the same under
both valuation formats (i.e., WTP and EL). However, if the NLIB hypothesis is true, then
in the probability space that trading is expected, money given to buy the mug would not
be treated as a loss in the WTP treatment. Thus, the respective states are not weighted by
the loss aversion coefficient in the expected utility of the decision-makers as the feeling of
loss is outweighed by that of a gain (i.e. getting the mug). Under the EL framing however,
subjects do perceive money given in the same states as losses, since money are given to avoid
losing the product and not to buy it (buying the product would feel like a gain). Table 1
summarizes the hypotheses that would be supported given null or non-null treatment effects
for the T1 and T
EL
0 treatments.
Treatment T2 was designed to reveal price anchoring effects, if any. T2 is similar to T1
(we use the same 120-number virtual urn), but this time the (60) numbers that corresponded
to six-euros prices in T1 now corresponded to prices in the e6-e12 continuum, so that the
mapping of numbers to prices was as follows: {1, 2, . . . , 59, 60, 61 . . . 119, 120} → {0.1e,
0.2e, . . . , 5.9e, 6.0e, 6.1e, . . . , 11.9e, 12.0e} (see Table A3). As a result, expected
outcomes, remain unaffected between treatments T2 and T1 for bids up to e6. To keep
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Table 1: Treatment effects for the T1 and T
EL
0 treatments (compared to T0) and supported
hypothesis
T1
Treatment Effect
TEL0
Treatment Effect
Loss Aversion
NLIB
hypothesis
Reference Point
Status-Quo Expectations
Null Non-null 4 ? 4 8
Non-null Null 4 8 8 4
Null Null 8 8 8 8
Non-null Non-null 8 4 8 4
loss anchors between T2 and T1 at the same levels, subjects were explicitly informed in the
experimental instructions stage that even though drawn prices could be up to e12, the
maximum they could end up paying at the end of the session was e6. So, if the randomly
drawn number corresponded to a price of more than e6 and their bid was higher than that,
then they would get the mug and pay e6; while if the randomly drawn number corresponded
to a price less than e6 and their bid was higher than that, then they would get the mug
and pay the price corresponding to the randomly drawn number. It is important to note
here that we made sure subjects realized this was part of the pricing mechanism and not
attached to any discount or any other promotion plan. To do so, we have excluded such
words from the experimenter’s vocabulary and explicitly pointed to the mechanism during
the examples.8 Based on the above, a positive treatment effect of T2 compared to T1 would
indicate an anchoring bias of subjects’ bids on the possible prices of the mug.
In the last treatment (T3) we used the same virtual urn and price correspondence as
in treatment T2 but this time the loss censoring was absent. That is, treatment T3 is a
typical BDM mechanism where prices are randomly drawn from the price interval e0.1 -
e12.0. Compared to treatment T2, price anchors and expected outcomes for bids in the
{e0.1, . . .e6.0} interval remain the same but loss anchors are increased since now subjects
are faced with higher possible losses as the mechanism allows payments of up to e12.
The total number of subjects that participated in each treatment was 59 for the base-
line treatment T0, and 58, 66, 58 and 59 for treatments T1, T
EL
0 , T2 and T3, respectively.
Anonymity and privacy were emphasized in the experimental instructions stage and all sub-
jects were reassured of these throughout the experiment. In particular, we closely followed
the procedures described in Plott and Zeiler (2004). After signing the consent form, subjects
drew a numbered card privately and were then seated to a private booth. In each booth,
there was a set of sealed experimental instructions. Subjects were explicitly instructed not
to unseal the instructions until they were asked to do so. With the help of a lab assistant,
8A test on the proportion of bids that are higher than e6 between treatment T2 and treatment T3
(discussed momentarily), where the pricing truncation rule of treatment T2 was absent, does not reject the
null hypothesis (p-value=0.38), so such perceptions are not likely to have affected bidding behavior.
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they input their ID number to a field shown in their computer screen; this number was their
ID for the rest of the session.
At the end of each session and while subjects completed the accompanying questionnaire,
the experimenter calculated the amount of money the subjects should receive (i.e., subtract-
ing from their fees any payment for the mug) and checked whether they were entitled to get
a mug or not. For each subject ID, the experimenter sealed the corresponding amount into
an envelop that had the specific number printed on the outside and also compiled a new list
with the set of IDs that should receive a mug. Both the envelop and the list were given to
another lab assistant that passed them on to a third lab assistant located in another building
in the campus, just a few meters away from the lab location. The third lab assistant who
received the envelop and the list was instructed to give the envelops and mugs based on the
card numbers subjects were holding and was completely unaware of any other details regard-
ing the experiment. Therefore, after the session was over, subjects simply left the computer
lab holding their ID cards and then walked to the other building to exchange it with the
corresponding envelop with their earnings and possibly (depending on the outcome of the
experiment) a mug. In the instructions, we also avoided using strong words such as ‘buy’,
‘it’s yours’, ‘you own’ etc. that could potentially affect the behavior of the participants.
Table 2: Designs aspects per Treatment
Treatment
Numbers in
virtual urn
Price Range Max. Loss
Prob. of leaving the
experiment with the mug*
T0 1-60 e0.1-e6.0 e6.0
BID
6
TEL0 1-60 e0.1-e6.0 e6.0
BID
6
T1 1-120 e0.1-e6.0 e6.0
BID
12
T2 1-120 e0.1-e12.0 e6.0
BID
12
T3 1-120 e0.1-e12.0 e12.0
BID
12
* For 0 ≤ BID < 6
4 Results
Before we analyze our data to estimate the treatment effects, we will first try to establish
whether the effect from our experiment can be interpreted as causal. Typically, experimen-
talists use statistical tests (often called balance tests) to test for equality of various covariates
between treatments. A failure to reject the null is interpreted as a good balance of observable
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characteristics between treatments and a success of the randomization process. Briz et al.
(2017) provide a detailed discussion about the literature that points to the pitfalls of using
balance tests (e.g., Deaton and Cartwright, 2017; Ho et al., 2007; Moher et al., 2010; Mutz
and Pemantle, 2015). Following Deaton and Cartwright’s (2017) advice, we report instead
the standardized difference in means (Imbens and Rubin, 2016; Imbens and Wooldridge,
2009). Table 3 also reports the standardized differences between the pairs of treatments that
are meaningful for the purposes of the experiment for all variables. For continuous vari-
ables this difference is calculated as |x¯1 − x¯2|/
√
(s21 + s
2
2)/2 while for the dichotomous ones
as |pˆ1 − pˆ2|/
√
(p1(1− p1) + p2(1− p1))/2 with x¯j, pˆj and s2j (j = 1, 2) denoting the group
means, prevalences and variances, respectively (Austin, 2009). The standardized difference
is a scale-free measure and Cochran and Rubin’s (1973) rule of thumb establishes a threshold
of 0.25, below which the effect size of the difference is expected to be small. As shown in
the table, for most of the variables, standardized differences between treatments are very
small. There are a few cases for which standardized differences are higher than Cochran and
Rubin’s (1973) limit. This might imply that it is necessary to control for the effect of these
characteristics on bidding behavior. However, the null of joint insignificance of demographic
variables cannot be rejected both by the Wald test using a simultaneous-quantile regression
of all deciles of bids with 1000 bootstrap replications (p-value=0.99) as well as by the rank
test statistic using the Wilcoxon score (for details, see Gutenbrunner et al., 1993) over the
entire range of quantiles (p-value=0.42). As a result, we do not expect treatment effects to
be driven by observable differences between the treatment groups.
Table 3: Summary statistics of observable characteristics
Standardized Difference
Variables Levels N Mean SD T0 vs. T1 T0 vs. T
EL
0 T2 vs. T1 T2 vs. T3
Age 300 20.48 2.3 0.03 0.24 0.02 0.07
Gender
Female
300
62.90%
0.09 0.39 0.07 0.07
Male 37.10%
Relative
economic
position
(Very) Bad
300
4.67% 0.08 0.00 0.10 0.16
Below Average 13.67% 0.04 0.04 0.35 0.03
Average 45.00% 0.15 0.20 0.17 0.07
Above Average 22.67% 0.32 0.24 0.11 0.26
(Very) Good 14.00% 0.15 0.05 0.02 0.17
Department
Biotechnology
300
13.00% 0.11 0.19 0.10 0.18
Economics 19.67% 0.09 0.14 0.15 0.37
Natural Resources 15.00% 0.38 0.14 0.31 0.10
Animal Science 11.67% 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.28
Food Science 17.33% 0.12 0.04 0.24 0.20
Plant Science 23.33% 0.25 0.00 0.19 0.01
As shown in the table, the majority of subjects were female, relatively young since the
majority of students were at their first three years of their studies (note, that the univer-
14
sity offers a 5-year bachelor degree), of average relative income, and split between the six
departments of the university in proportion to the size of the population of each department.
In order to avoid artificial differences in the analysis of bidding behavior induced by
our experimental design (recall that some treatments implemented a price support of {e0.1
. . . , e6.0} while others a support of {e0.1 . . . , e12.0}) and to standardize the analysis
across treatments, we censored all bids higher than e6 (15 observations in total or 5% of all
observations) to a value of e6 (i.e., these observations were recoded as e6).9 We proceed
in this manner because it is the only way to have comparable bids among all treatments
since, by design, in treatments T0, T
EL
0 , T1 and T2, bids that are higher than e6 have no
quantitative meaning and are only indicative of a valuation that is higher than e6. To
understand why, remember that the highest possible price in T0, T1 was e6, so bidding
anything above that price yields the same probability of leaving the experiment with the
mug (i.e. 100%) and the same expected payment conditional on buying as bidding e6 (i.e.,
bid/2). For T2, the expected utility from any bid (b) that is higher than e6 is
1
2
(u (m)− 3)+∫ b
6
(u (m)− 6) f(p) dp, with u(m) denoting the utility associated with getting the mug. It
is obvious that increasing one’s bid to the highest price maximizes this utility; the same
argument can be made for reference-dependent expected utility with status-quo acting as
the reference point. For expectations-based reference-dependent expected utility maximizers,
the benefit of increasing one’s bid is not only the maximization of the utility part associated
with the expected gain from getting the mug at the price of e6, but also minimization of
one’s (dis)utility associated with the loss sensation attached to not getting the mug when
she expects to do so.
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics of bids per treatment and Figure 2 exhibits box plots
of bids. Table 4 also provides estimates of bid deciles by treatment, based on the quantile
estimator suggested by Harrell et al. (1982).
Table 4: Descriptives statistics of bids per Treatment
Harrell-Davis decile estimates
Treatment N Mean SD p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6 p7 p8 p9
T0 59 2.14 1.40 0.22 0.76 1.23 1.72 2.11 2.55 2.99 3.42 3.93
T1 58 1.76 1.72 0.08 0.35 0.60 0.94 1.33 1.73 2.06 2.86 5.85
T2 66 2.45 1.96 0.17 0.58 1.10 1.53 1.95 2.58 3.40 4.52 5.80
T3 58 2.08 1.88 0.02 0.26 0.75 1.20 1.60 2.15 2.88 3.76 5.31
TEL0 59 1.85 1.84 0.06 0.25 0.67 0.98 1.26 1.74 2.19 3.17 5.33
Notes: SD stands for standard deviation and p1 to p10 stand for deciles.
At a first glance, everything seems consistent with the behavioral biases presented above.
9Our results do not change qualitatively, when we exclude these observations from the analysis.
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In particular, we observe that in T1, the bids are lower than those in T0 which suggests that
lowering expectations of leaving the experiment with the mug given one’s bid induces lower
valuations. Also, price anchoring manifests itself in the higher bids observed in T2, relative
to T1, while loss anchoring drives T3 bids to lower levels than those in T2.
Figure 2: Box plots of bids per treatment
Table 5 shows the results of various tests for differences between treatments: p-values
of Mann-Whitney (Mann and Whitney, 1947) and Mood’s (1954) median tests and decile
differences using the Harrell-Davis estimator Harrell et al. (1982) along with the p-values
associated with them calculated based on percentile bootstrap (Wilcox et al., 2013). The
comparisons are meant to reveal the treatment effects between pairs of treatments for which
their difference directly tests the underlying hypotheses discussed in Section 3. The first row
in Table 5 lists the effect we are testing for and the second column lists the treatments we
compare that are relevant in measuring the listed effect.
Figure 3 depicts the empirical distribution of bids for the various treatments. Both the
Mann-Whitney and the median test show a (statistically) significant effect of expectations
and loss aversion but not of loss anchoring. In addition, the Mann-Whitney test returns a
statistically significant effect for price anchoring. Looking at the bid distribution graphs in
Figure 3, we observe that the distribution of the bids from T2 stochastically dominates the
bid distribution from both T1 and T3 (see figure 3b). This implies that bids from T2 are
higher than those from the T1 and T3 treatments. However, going back to Table 5 only the
difference between T2 and T1 is statistically significant based on the Mann-Whitney test.
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Table 5: Tests of treatment effects
Test Expectations Loss Aversion Price Anchoring Loss Anchoring
Comparison T0 vs. T1 T0 vs. T
EL
0 T2 vs. T1 T2 vs. T3
M-W 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.22
Median 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.47
p1
0.14
(0.33)
0.15
(0.19)
0.09
(0.36)
0.15
(0.14)
p2
0.41
(0.17)
0.51
(0.14)
0.23
(0.31)
0.32
(0.30)
p3
0.63
(0.05)
0.57
(0.06)
0.50
(0.12)
0.35
(0.35)
p4
0.78
(0.04)
0.73
(0.03)
0.58
(0.06)
0.33
(0.32)
p5
0.79
(0.03)
0.84
(0.03)
0.62
(0.06)
0.34
(0.37)
p6
0.81
(0.02)
0.81
(0.04)
0.85
(0.02)
0.43
(0.43)
p7
0.93
(0.05)
0.80
(0.13)
1.34
(0.02)
0.52
(0.39)
p8
0.56
(0.41)
0.24
(0.78)
1.67
(0.07)
0.76
(0.33)
p9
-0.91
(0.40)
-1.4
(0.20)
0.96
(0.20)
0.50
(0.42)
Notes: Row labeled ‘M-W’ shows p-values of Mann-Whitney tests. Row labeled ‘Median’ shows
p-values of Pearson’s χ2 test of equality of medians. Rows labeled p1 to p10 show Harrell-Davis
(Harrell et al., 1982) estimator of quantile difference; in parenthesis p-values of Wilcox et al.
(2013) test for quantile differences based on bootstrap samples; in bold, statistically significant
differences at the 90% confidence level.
(a) T0 vs T1 vs T
EL
0 (b) T1 vs T2 vs T3
Figure 3: Empirical Distributions of Bids per Treatment
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These comparisons are projected on the kernel density estimates of bids in each treatment
in Figure 4. Figure 4a and 4b show that T1 and T
EL
0 bid distributions are more right-skewed
compared to that of the baseline treatment T0. On the other hand, Figure 4c and 4d
show that bids in the T2 treatment are more spread than in the T1 treatment while the
distributions of T2 and T3 treatments are similar, with the T3 treatment being slightly more
positively-skewed than the T2 treatment.
(a) T0 (upper graph) vs T1 (lower graph) (b) T0 (upper graph) vs T
EL
0 (lower graph)
(c) T2 (upper graph) vs T1 (lower graph) (d) T2 (upper graph) vs T3 (lower graph)
Figure 4: Comparison of Kernel Density Estimates between Treatments
Table 5 in conjunction with the visualization provided in Figure 4 imply that treat-
ment effects are not homogeneous as they seem to affect the distribution of bids only in
particular locations. More specifically, the effect of expectations on bids is robust and has
a particular pattern (see Figure 4a), with a lower density of bids slightly above the me-
dian price and a higher density of bids at the tails of the price distribution (mainly at the
left). Regarding loss aversion, although TEL0 was designed just in case our results were not
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supportive of expectation-based preferences (as mentioned before, we find significant sup-
port for expectation-based preferences), the treatment yields interesting results by itself (see
Figure 4b). The TEL0 treatment yields a significant treatment effect, similar to that of T1
when compared to the T0 treatment. When comparing T2 vs. T1, we see that T2 has an
effect that is located mainly on the higher quantiles of the bid distribution indicating that
anchoring might have a more profound effect on subjects bidding at the higher end of the
price distribution. Finally, comparison of T2 with T3 reveals a non-statistically significantly
difference.
5 Discussion
The popularity of the BDM mechanism in WTP value elicitation relies on its simplicity
and incentive compatibility under EUT. However, red flags have been raised about the
usefulness of the mechanism given that subjects’ behavior in the BDM has been found to
be driven by several biases that are not included in the EUT paradigm. In this paper,
we attempted to examine a number of these biases, such as reference-dependent preferences,
expectation-based reference points as well as price and loss anchoring. By varying the amount
of numbered labels in a virtual urn and mapping these numbered labels into prices, we were
able to disentangle the effect of these biases on bidding behavior in a way that does not
deviate from the rational of regular BDM experimental tasks. It is also important to note
that we achieved this without having to introduce additional lotteries that would further
challenge the cognitive ability of subjects and might cause misconceptions.
Comparing the full distribution of bids across treatments, we identify various treatment
effects. The T0 vs. T1 treatments show a significant treatment effect which we can attribute
on expectations in the Ko˝szegi and Rabin’s (2006) framework. In addition, this result is not
in line with other competing models of expectation-based preferences, such as the ‘good-deal
model’ of Wenner (2015) or the ‘bad-deal aversion’ model of Isoni (2011). In particular, based
on the ‘good-deal model’ (Wenner, 2015), bids in the T1 treatment should have been higher
than the baseline T0 treatment, since the mug was more ‘expensive’ (in terms of expected
price) in T1 and thus, higher prices should have felt as a better deal to subjects, making them
more acceptable. On the other hand, the ‘bad-deal aversion’ model (Isoni, 2011) assumes
that in the formulation of the reference price, only those prices that consumers are willing to
pay actually matter. In the BDM framework, this corresponds to those prices that are lower
than subject’s bid. Since the reference price or the expected price conditional on buying the
mug for all bids in the {0.1e, 6.0e} interval was the same in both treatments (equal to bid
2
),
we should have observed a null treatment effect. Given the above, the only plausible model
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that is compatible with the treatment effect we observe is that of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006).
In reference to the equivalent loss TEL0 treatment, since our results indicate that bids in
TEL0 were different than the baseline T0 treatment and since a non-null effect was detected
in T1 (when compared to T0), the hypothesis that bidders are loss averse (i.e., they dislike
losses relative to a reference point more than they like same-sized gains) cannot be rejected.
However, as described in Section 3 and in Table 1, a pair of non-null treatment effects for
T1 vs. T0 and T
EL
0 vs. T0 is supportive of the no-loss-in-buying hypothesis of Novemsky and
Kahneman (2005).
Finally, the mechanism of anchoring on the highest possible price was also found to
influence subjects valuations, driving bids to higher levels. In our study, this is manifested by
the observed differences between the bid distributions in treatments T1 and T2. In contrast,
the highest possible loss that could make the utility associated with money more salient,
according to our loss anchoring hypothesis, seems not to influence valuations given that
the observed differences between treatments treatments T2 and T3 were not statistically
significantly different.
Concluding, our results generally indicate that previous research findings that casted
doubts on the incentive compatibility of the BDM mechanism were made on valid ground.
Bids derived from the BDM mechanism are indeed dependent on the underlying distributions
of the random competing bid, due to the expectations they generate and the anchoring of
bids to the chosen price support. Our results also support the no-loss-in-buying hypothesis
of Novemsky and Kahneman (2005) but not the mechanism of loss-anchoring. With regards
to expectations, the behavior we observe is in line with one strand of literature (e.g Banerji
and Gupta, 2014; Marzilli Ericson and Fuster, 2011) that supports the model of Ko˝szegi and
Rabin (2006) but goes against another strand of the literature that is in favor of alterna-
tive theories of distributional dependence (e.g Isoni, 2011; Mazar et al., 2013; Smith, 2012;
Wenner, 2015).
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Experimental Instructions
[This is a translation of the original instructions written in Greek. Instructions were provided
in hard copies and each box represents a separate page in the instructions. Differences in
instructions between treatments are shown in different color and are included in square
brackets. A prefix (T0, T1, T
EL
0 , T2, T3) indicates that a specific part of the text was only
included in the treatment indicated by the prefix. Explanatory text for the reader is also
colored and included in square brackets.]
Welcome!
Thank you for agreeing to participate in a survey of how people make decisions. Please read
carefully the instructions given below.
There are no right and wrong answers to any of the questions you will answer, we just want
to know your opinion.
It is very important to follow the instructions carefully. Also, it is very important not to
communicate with other participants. If you have any questions at any stage of the
experiment, please raise your hand and the experimenter will answer to you in private.
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As you know already, for your participation in the experiment, you will get 10 euros.
For practical reasons, money will be given to you at the end of the session along with any
items you may get, based on your decisions during the experiment. In any case consider that
these money are already in you pocket. [TEL0 : In addition, you are now given a piece of mug
with the university logo that is in front of you.]
Now, take some time and carefully examine the mug with the university logo in front of you.
[At this point the experimenter instructed subjects to put down the instructions and hold the mug.
He also described the possible uses (drinking, pencil case, etc.) and advised them to feel the logo
while explaining the chemical coating that made it dishwasher-safe. This whole procedure lasted
about a minute and at the end, the subjects took again the instructions at hand.]
During this experiment you will be given the opportunity, if you wish, to acquire this mug
by paying a price. [TEL0 : At the end of the experiment you will have to return the mug.
However, during this session you will have the opportunity, if you wish, to acquire this mug
by paying a price.]
Below, you are given instructions on how we will determine the price of the mug and whether
you will leave the session with or without the mug.
The procedure
6 concrete steps:
You:
Step 1. Examine carefully the mug in front of you.
Step 2. Submit a bid for this mug on the computer. The bid you submit is final and can
not be changed after this step.
The Computer:
Step 3. Draws a random number between 1 and 60 [T1,T2,T3: 120]. All numbers in this
interval have exactly the same chance of being drawn. Also, this number is different for
each of the participants.
Step 4. Assigns this random number to a price based on table 1 given on the last page of
this instructions.[ The table was different depending on the treatment: either Table A1,
A2 or A3 was placed at the last page of the instructions.]
Step 5. Announces the price to you.
Step 6. Compares the price with the bid you submitted. If your offer is less than this price
then you will not leave the experiment with the mug and you will get the full fee of e10.00
for your participation.
If your bid is greater than or equal to this price, then you will leave the experiment with
the mug and an amount will be subtraacted from your e10 participation fee. The amount
you will pay is the randomly determined price and and not the offer you submitted .
[T3: If the price is higher than e6, then the amount that will be subtracted from your fee
is e6 and not the whole price. Namely, there is no way you may pay more than
e6.]
2
What is the probability of leaving the experiment with the mug?
The total number of amounts in Table 1 is 60 [T1,T2,T3: 12]. Each bid corresponds to a
unique chance to get the mug at the end of the survey and this is given by the number of
table 1 values that are less than or equal to your bid over 60 [T1,T2,T3: 120].
For example, let’s say that your bid is equal to eK. If eK is less than e6.0 [T1,T2: e12.0],
then the probability of taking the mug is calculated as follows:
Random Number: 1 , 2 , 3 , · · · , X , · · · , 57 , 58 , 59 , 60
↓ , ↓ , ↓ , · · · , ↓ , · · · , ↓ , ↓ , ↓ , ↓
Mug Price: 0, 1e , 0, 2e , 0, 3e , · · · , Ke︸ ︷︷ ︸
N1
, · · · , 5, 7e , 5, 8e , 5, 9e , 6, 0e︸ ︷︷ ︸
N2
Probability: N1
N1+N2
= N1
60
%
[T3:
Random No: 1 , 2 , 3 , · · · , X , · · · , 59 , 60 , 61 , 62 , · · · , 119 , 120
↓ , ↓ , ↓ , · · · , ↓ , · · · , ↓ , ↓ , ↓ , ↓ , · · · , ↓ , ↓
Mug Price: 0, 1e , 0, 2e , 0, 3e , · · · , Ke︸ ︷︷ ︸
N1
, · · · , 5, 9e , 6, 0e , 6, 0e , 6, 0e , · · · , 6, 0e , 6, 0e︸ ︷︷ ︸
N2
Probability: N1
N1+N2
= N1
120
%]
[T1,T2:
Random Number: 1 , 2 , 3 , · · · , X , · · · , 117 , 118 , 119 , 120
↓ , ↓ , ↓ , · · · , ↓ , · · · , ↓ , ↓ , ↓ , ↓
Mug Price: 0, 1e , 0, 2e , 0, 3e , · · · , Ke︸ ︷︷ ︸
N1
, · · · , 11, 7e , 11, 8e , 11, 9e , 12, 0e︸ ︷︷ ︸
N2
Probability: N1
N1+N2
= N1
120
%]
During the experiment, you will not have to do this calculation yourself; the computer will
do it for you. It is very important, however, to understand how this probability is calculated.
Numerical examples are given below.
FACTS:
• If you bid e0.0, the probability of leaving the experiment with the mug is 0% .
• If you bid e6.0 [T2,T3: e12.0] or more, the probability of leaving the experiment with
the mug is 100% .
3
How much will you pay?
2 possible scenarios: [T2: 3 possible scenarios:]
Scen 1: Your bid is less than the price. In this case, you pay nothing since you do not get
the mug.
Scen 2: Your bid is greater than or equal to the price [T2: and the price is less than e6].
In this case, you get the mug and you pay an amount equal to the price.
[T2:
Scen 3: T2 only: Your bid is greater than or equal to the price and the price is greater than
e6. In this case, you get the mug and you pay e6.]
FACTS:
• It is not possible that you pay an amount that is higher than your bid.
• If your bid is e0.0, you will definitely not pay.
• If your bid is equal to or greater than e6.0 [T2,T3: e12.0], you will definitely pay an
amount between e0.1 and e6.0 [T2: e12.0].
4
Example 1 [The hypothetical bids for all 3 examples were the same across
treatments but price lists, probabilities and outcomes were adjusted based on
the specificities of each treatment.]
Let’s assume that instead of the mug we asked you to bid for a USB flash drive with a
capacity of 8 GB.
Suppose you submit a bid of e0.8. With this bid, the chance to leave the experiment with
the USB flash drive would be:
Random
Number
USB
Price
Random
Number
USB
Price
Random
Number
USB
Price
1 −→ 0,1 e 21 −→ 2,1 e 41 −→ 4,1 e
2 −→ 0,2 e 22 −→ 2,2 e 42 −→ 4,2 e
3 −→ 0,3 e 23 −→ 2,3 e 43 −→ 4,3 e
4 −→ 0,4 e 24 −→ 2,4 e 44 −→ 4,4 e
5 −→ 0,5 e 25 −→ 2,5 e 45 −→ 4,5 e
6 −→ 0,6 e 26 −→ 2,6 e 46 −→ 4,6 e
7 −→ 0,7 e 27 −→ 2,7 e 47 −→ 4,7 e
8 −→ 0,8 e 28 −→ 2,8 e 48 −→ 4,8 e
9 −→ 0,9 e 29 −→ 2,9 e 49 −→ 4,9 e
10 −→ 1,0 e 30 −→ 3,0 e 50 −→ 5,0 e
11 −→ 1,1 e 31 −→ 3,1 e 51 −→ 5,1 e
12 −→ 1,2 e 32 −→ 3,2 e 52 −→ 5,2 e
13 −→ 1,3 e 33 −→ 3,3 e 53 −→ 5,3 e
14 −→ 1,4 e 34 −→ 3,4 e 54 −→ 5,4 e
15 −→ 1,5 e 35 −→ 3,5 e 55 −→ 5,5 e
16 −→ 1,6 e 36 −→ 3,6 e 56 −→ 5,6 e
17 −→ 1,7 e 37 −→ 3,7 e 57 −→ 5,7 e
18 −→ 1,8 e 38 −→ 3,8 e 58 −→ 5,8 e
19 −→ 1,9 e 39 −→ 3,9 e 59 −→ 5,9 e
20 −→ 2,0 e 40 −→ 4,0 e 60 −→ 6,0 e
Probability: 8
8+52
= 8
60
= 13, 33%
In case you got the USB flash, the maximum amount you would need to pay would be
e0.8. In fact, you would pay an amount that would have been randomly selected among
the 8 prices highlighted in yellow.
5
Example 2
Let’s assume that instead of the mug we asked you to bid for a USB flash drive with a
capacity of 8 GB.
Suppose you submit a bid of e5.3. With this bid, the chance to leave the experiment with
the USB flash drive would be:
Random
Number
USB
Price
Random
Number
USB
Price
Random
Number
USB
Price
1 −→ 0,1 e 21 −→ 2,1 e 41 −→ 4,1 e
2 −→ 0,2 e 22 −→ 2,2 e 42 −→ 4,2 e
3 −→ 0,3 e 23 −→ 2,3 e 43 −→ 4,3 e
4 −→ 0,4 e 24 −→ 2,4 e 44 −→ 4,4 e
5 −→ 0,5 e 25 −→ 2,5 e 45 −→ 4,5 e
6 −→ 0,6 e 26 −→ 2,6 e 46 −→ 4,6 e
7 −→ 0,7 e 27 −→ 2,7 e 47 −→ 4,7 e
8 −→ 0,8 e 28 −→ 2,8 e 48 −→ 4,8 e
9 −→ 0,9 e 29 −→ 2,9 e 49 −→ 4,9 e
10 −→ 1,0 e 30 −→ 3,0 e 50 −→ 5,0 e
11 −→ 1,1 e 31 −→ 3,1 e 51 −→ 5,1 e
12 −→ 1,2 e 32 −→ 3,2 e 52 −→ 5,2 e
13 −→ 1,3 e 33 −→ 3,3 e 53 −→ 5,3 e
14 −→ 1,4 e 34 −→ 3,4 e 54 −→ 5,4 e
15 −→ 1,5 e 35 −→ 3,5 e 55 −→ 5,5 e
16 −→ 1,6 e 36 −→ 3,6 e 56 −→ 5,6 e
17 −→ 1,7 e 37 −→ 3,7 e 57 −→ 5,7 e
18 −→ 1,8 e 38 −→ 3,8 e 58 −→ 5,8 e
19 −→ 1,9 e 39 −→ 3,9 e 59 −→ 5,9 e
20 −→ 2,0 e 40 −→ 4,0 e 60 −→ 6,0 e
Probability: 53
53+7
= 53
60
= 88, 33%
In case you got the USB flash, the maximum amount you would need to pay would be
e5.3. In fact, you would pay an amount that would have been randomly selected among
the 53 prices highlighted in yellow.
6
Example 3
Let’s assume that instead of the mug we asked you to bid for a USB flash drive with a
capacity of 8 GB.
Suppose you submit a bid of e10.6. With this bid, the chance to leave the experiment with
the USB flash drive would be:
Random
Number
USB
Price
Random
Number
USB
Price
Random
Number
USB
Price
1 −→ 0,1 e 21 −→ 2,1 e 41 −→ 4,1 e
2 −→ 0,2 e 22 −→ 2,2 e 42 −→ 4,2 e
3 −→ 0,3 e 23 −→ 2,3 e 43 −→ 4,3 e
4 −→ 0,4 e 24 −→ 2,4 e 44 −→ 4,4 e
5 −→ 0,5 e 25 −→ 2,5 e 45 −→ 4,5 e
6 −→ 0,6 e 26 −→ 2,6 e 46 −→ 4,6 e
7 −→ 0,7 e 27 −→ 2,7 e 47 −→ 4,7 e
8 −→ 0,8 e 28 −→ 2,8 e 48 −→ 4,8 e
9 −→ 0,9 e 29 −→ 2,9 e 49 −→ 4,9 e
10 −→ 1,0 e 30 −→ 3,0 e 50 −→ 5,0 e
11 −→ 1,1 e 31 −→ 3,1 e 51 −→ 5,1 e
12 −→ 1,2 e 32 −→ 3,2 e 52 −→ 5,2 e
13 −→ 1,3 e 33 −→ 3,3 e 53 −→ 5,3 e
14 −→ 1,4 e 34 −→ 3,4 e 54 −→ 5,4 e
15 −→ 1,5 e 35 −→ 3,5 e 55 −→ 5,5 e
16 −→ 1,6 e 36 −→ 3,6 e 56 −→ 5,6 e
17 −→ 1,7 e 37 −→ 3,7 e 57 −→ 5,7 e
18 −→ 1,8 e 38 −→ 3,8 e 58 −→ 5,8 e
19 −→ 1,9 e 39 −→ 3,9 e 59 −→ 5,9 e
20 −→ 2,0 e 40 −→ 4,0 e 60 −→ 6,0 e
Probability: 60
60
= 100, 00%
In case you got the USB flash, the maximum amount you would need to pay would be e6.
In fact, you would pay an amount that would have been randomly selected among the 60
prices highlighted in yellow.
7
TRUE-FALSE questions. (Correct answers are highlighted in bold. If you do not agree
or do not understand the reaoning, please raise your hand and the experimenter will respond
to you in private)[When reading the instructions aloud, the experimenter explained the
reasoning behind each of these answers.]
1. If your offer is greater than the cup price then you get the mug and you pay an amount
equal to your offer.
A. True B. False
2. If your offer is less than the randomly drawn price, you may get the mug.
A. True B. False
3. You may pay less than your offer but you will never pay more.
A. True B. False
4. The price of the mug depends on the offers of the other participants in the experiment.
A. True B. False
5. The probability to get the mug depends on your offer.
A. True B. False
6. The mug price is the same for all participants in the experiment.
A. True B. False
7. You may have to pay some amount, even if you do not get the mug.
A. True B. False
8
How do I submit my bid? When the experiment will start, you will see the following
screen on your computer.
To submit a bid you will need to move the bar to where the bid is located. Each point on
the horizontal line corresponds to a specific amount. The bar can be moved in 2 ways:
• Left-click on the point you want to move it.
• Writing your bid in square 4 shown in the photo, then left clicking on the gray
button “Move the bar”. (The point of the decimal point should be the dot instead of
the comma. If you would like to write 94 Euros and 10 cents, you would write 94.1
rather than 94,1 )
As you move the bar, just above it, squares 1, 2 and 3 give you some information.
Square 1 informs you about the amount that corresponds to the location of the bar.
Square 2 informs you about the probability of leaving the experiment with the mug,
should you submit this bid. The way this is calculated is the one explained above.
Square 3 informs you about the highest amount you may pay if you submit this bid.
After you move the bar to the point that corresponds to the bid you want to submit and
after making sure your bid is displayed correctly in square 5, press the red ”Submit”
button. From this point on, your bid can not be changed.
9
After you submit your bid, the following screen will appear in your screen:
At the red square you will see your offer, which you CANNOT change. The fields “THE
RANDOM NUMBER IS:” and “THE MUG PRICE IS:” will appear empty until you press
the red button (bottom right) and the draw takes place.
After clicking on the red button, a new screen informs you of the drawn number and the
mug price (based on table 1).
if your bid is greater than or equal to the price, it also informs you that you will get the
mug at the end of the experiment, it announces the amount to be deducted from your fee
and what is the total amount you will receive (after deducting the price you will pay).
10
If your bid is lower than the price, the screen will inform you that you will not get the mug
at the end of the experiment, and that no amount will be deducted from your fee, thus you
will receive e10.00
After clicking OK, a short questionnaire will follow. Please answer as accurately as possible.
If you have finished reading the instructions and have fully understood the procedure, please
wait until further instructions are given.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will come to ex-
plain.[After answering all the questions, the experimenter described the payment process as
well as how anonymity of the decisions is ensured. He also informed the participants that 10
(hypothetical) practice rounds would be run for USB flash drive used as an example above.]
11
Additional tables and pictures
Figure A1: Mug with university logo
12
Table A1: Mapping of numbers in the virtual urn with prices in the T0 and TEL treatments
Random
Number
Mug
Price
Random
Number
Mug
Price
Random
Number
Mug
Price
1 −→ 0,1 e 21 −→ 2,1 e 41 −→ 4,1 e
2 −→ 0,2 e 22 −→ 2,2 e 42 −→ 4,2 e
3 −→ 0,3 e 23 −→ 2,3 e 43 −→ 4,3 e
4 −→ 0,4 e 24 −→ 2,4 e 44 −→ 4,4 e
5 −→ 0,5 e 25 −→ 2,5 e 45 −→ 4,5 e
6 −→ 0,6 e 26 −→ 2,6 e 46 −→ 4,6 e
7 −→ 0,7 e 27 −→ 2,7 e 47 −→ 4,7 e
8 −→ 0,8 e 28 −→ 2,8 e 48 −→ 4,8 e
9 −→ 0,9 e 29 −→ 2,9 e 49 −→ 4,9 e
10 −→ 1,0 e 30 −→ 3,0 e 50 −→ 5,0 e
11 −→ 1,1 e 31 −→ 3,1 e 51 −→ 5,1 e
12 −→ 1,2 e 32 −→ 3,2 e 52 −→ 5,2 e
13 −→ 1,3 e 33 −→ 3,3 e 53 −→ 5,3 e
14 −→ 1,4 e 34 −→ 3,4 e 54 −→ 5,4 e
15 −→ 1,5 e 35 −→ 3,5 e 55 −→ 5,5 e
16 −→ 1,6 e 36 −→ 3,6 e 56 −→ 5,6 e
17 −→ 1,7 e 37 −→ 3,7 e 57 −→ 5,7 e
18 −→ 1,8 e 38 −→ 3,8 e 58 −→ 5,8 e
19 −→ 1,9 e 39 −→ 3,9 e 59 −→ 5,9 e
20 −→ 2,0 e 40 −→ 4,0 e 60 −→ 6,0 e
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